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How to investigate perceptual projection: 
a commentary on pereira jr., “tHe projective tHeory 
of consciousness: from neuroscience to 
pHilosopHical psycHology”
Max Velmans1
abstract: This commentary focuses on the scientific status of perceptual projection—a central feature 
of Pereira’s projective theory of consciousness. In his target article, he draws on my own earlier work to 
develop an explanatory framework for integrating first-person viewable conscious experience with the 
third-person viewable neural correlates and antecedent causes that form conscious experience into a 
bipolar structure that contains both a sense of self (created by interoceptive projective processes) and a 
sense of the world (created by exteroceptive projective processes). I stress that perceptual projection is 
a psychological effect (not an explanation for that effect) and list many of the ways it has been studied 
within experimental psychology, for example in studies of depth perception in vision and audition and 
experiences of depth arising from cues arranged on two-dimensional surfaces in stereoscopic pictures, 
3D cinemas, holograms, and virtual realities. I then juxtapose Pereira’s explanatory model with two 
other models that have similar aims and background assumptions but different orientations, Trehub’s 
Retinoid model, which focuses largely on the neural functioning of the visual system, and Rudrauf 
et al’s Projective Consciousness Model, which draws largely on projective geometries to specify the 
requirements of organisms that need to navigate a three-dimensional world, and how these might be 
implemented in human information processing. Together, these models illustrate both converging 
and diverging approaches to understanding the role of projective processes in human consciousness.
Key words: Perceptual projection. Projective theory of consciousness. Retinoid model. Phenomenology 
of consciousness. Phenomenal world.
In his target article, Pereira suggests a broad explanatory framework for 
integrating the phenomenology of human conscious experience (viewed from 
a first-person perspective) with its third-person viewable neural correlates 
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and antecedent preconscious mental processing. Although the contents 
of consciousness are indefinitely varied, there are, he notes, some enduring 
structures: 
The structure of consciousness was philosophically conceived a century 
ago (Husserl, 1913) as consisting of a subjective pole, the bearer of 
experiences, and an objective pole composed of experienced contents. 
In more recent formulations, Nagel (1974) refers to a “point of view”, 
in which qualitative experiences are anchored, while Velmans (1990; 
1993; 2009; 2017) understands that phenomenal content is composed of 
mental representations “projected” to the space external to the brains that 
constructs them. […] How to relate this bipolar structure with the results 
of neuroscience? I propose the notion of projection (also used by Williford 
et al., 2012) as a bridge principle connecting the neurobiological systems 
of knowing, feeling and acting with the bipolar structure. The projective 
process is considered responsible for the generation of the sense of self 
and the sense of the world, composing an informational phenomenal 
field generated by the nervous system and experienced in the first-person 
perspective. (PEREIRA JR, 2018, p. 200, my italics).
wHat is perceptual projection? 
In my own writings, for example in Velmans (1990, 2009), I stress 
that perceptual projection is a common, readily observable, psychological 
effect produced by preconscious mental processes. This experienced print, for 
example, seems to be out-there on this page along with the rest of the external, 
three-dimensional, phenomenal world. Given that preconscious processes 
within the brain, interacting with events in the external world, produce 
consciously experienced events that may be subjectively located and extended 
in the phenomenal space beyond the brain, how does this phenomenology get 
to be out-there? 
Mysterious though perceptual projection might seem, it has been widely 
investigated (under different names) by psychological science. For example:
There is convincing evidence that the experience of depth is, in part, a 
construction of the mind/brain … in cases of depth perception arising 
from cues arranged on two-dimensional surfaces in stereoscopic pictures, 
3D cinemas, holograms, and virtual realities—and I have reviewed 
scientific evidence for perceptual projection in various other sense 
modalities in chapter 6, and in more detail in Velmans (1990). One can 
also study underlying processes such as the perception of distance and 
location in space—standard topics in the psychology of perception that 
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one can find in any introductory psychology textbook. One can study 
the cues, or information in the light that contribute to depth perception 
(Hershenson, 1998), one can study the neural structures that support it 
(e.g. Goodale & Milner, 2004; Goodale, 2007) and one can study the 
various instances where depth perception breaks down (Robertson, 2004). 
One can also study how the judged metrics of phenomenal space relate to 
physical measurements of space (e.g. Lehar, 2003) and how both of these 
relate to neural state space. Given that neural state space is (by definition) 
in the brain, and that phenomenal state space is […] mostly outside the 
brain, an understanding of how neural state space relates to phenomenal 
state space would also provide a topology of perceptual projection. 
(VELMANS, 2009, p. 162).
A fuller understanding of perceptual projection also offers a more 
unified understanding of a wide range of phenomena experienced to have 
both location and extension, including phenomena as diverse as lucid 
dreams, hallucinations, eidetic imagery, the creation of virtual realities, the 
construction of a body image, and the normal perception of events in three-
dimensional space. Accepting perceptual projection as a normal effect (when 
perceptual processes form representations of events in the world) also makes 
it easier to understand what happens in artificial or pathological or situations. 
For example, three-dimensional virtual worlds can be understood to arise 
from artificial stimulation of the same projective processes that create normal, 
phenomenal worlds. Hallucinations can be understood to result from mental 
models that erroneously project information that has an internal rather 
than an external origin (consequent on a breakdown of the usually reliable 
modelling of internal versus external events). And projection, transference and 
counter-transference of the kinds that arise in therapeutic interactions can be 
understood as similar internal/external confusions where information about 
one’s own feelings, thoughts or past experiences are bound into one’s projected 
experience of another human being. As the processes that achieve “binding” 
and “projection” operate preconsciously, one literally experiences others to 
manifest the traits and qualities which in reality are one’s own. (VELMANS, 
2009, p. 163)
Although studies of these varied phenomena contribute to our 
understanding of the cues and processes that contribute to projective effects, 
they do not fully explain how proximal neural causes within the brain 
support experienced events that seem to be outside the brain. For this, we 
need an explanatory model—and no adequate explanatory model currently 
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exists. Virtual realities and projection holograms provide tempting analogies 
(VELMANS, 1998, 2009). In so far as virtual realities generate perceived 
3D worlds (in the absence of real ones) they provide an existence proof for 
projective psychological effects and provide creative ways of studying how 
information in the light provides cues on which projective processes operate. 
Projection holograms provide a tempting analogy for how information 
encoded on a 2D surface can be perceived as a 3D object in front of that 
surface, when viewed from an appropriate perspective. However, there is little 
convincing evidence that there is, literally, a “neural projection hologram” 
in the brain. Given the absence of an adequate explanation, the emergence 
of scientific models that both respect the 3D phenomenology of conscious 
experiences and provide a guide to projective neural processes that support 
them, is a welcome development. 
tHe pHenomenal world tHougHt of a bi-polar structure
In his paper, Pereira lists various additional investigative approaches 
to understanding projective processes, with (in principle) testable predictions 
that might reveal their underlying mechanisms. For example, by way of an 
elaboration to my suggestion that phenomenal space and its directly associated 
neural correlates encode identical information (about the world) that is 
formatted in different ways, Pereira adds the important point that these spaces 
are typically composed of a subjective pole (the sense of self ) and an objective 
pole (the sense of the world), thereby forming a bipolar structure. The same 
point has also been developed in depth by Trehub (1977, 2001, 2007) in 
his retinoid model of visual perception and, more recently, in the projective 
geometries explored by Rudrauf et al. (2017). However, the explanatory 
models they use differ both in orientation and detail. 
Pereira suggest that this subjective versus objective polarity arises from 
two forms of projection—an interoceptive projection that constructs a sense 
of self, and an exteroceptive projection that constructs a sense of the world. 
The subjective pole is conceived as the “attractor” in the dynamics of sensory, 
emotional and affective systems of the living body, generated in the feeling 
history of the individual, and projected as an invariant “identity” in time 
(experienced as the sense of self ). The objective pole, or sense of the world, is the 
projection of representations from the nervous system to its extensions related 
to the homeostasis and control of the body, which include neuro-muscular 
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junctions, kinaesthetic sensors in muscles, and the cardiac and enteric nervous 
systems. Following Mitterauer (2013), Pereira then goes on to suggest some 
underlying mechanisms involving two kinds of interacting, neurobiological 
signaling networks: astroglial (supporting waves of feeling in living tissue) and 
mental representations in neuronal spiking patterns (supporting a sense of the 
world). Both of these operate unconsciously to support what Pereira refers to 
as an extended conscious field—his term for what we normally think of as the 
conscious, phenomenal world that includes an “inner” sense of self as well as 
a three-dimensional extended body and a world extended beyond the body 
surface. 
Trehub, by contrast, develops a detailed model of how the brain 
constructs a representation of egocentric space around a sense of self based 
primarily on the structural and dynamic properties of layered cells and their 
projections within the visual system. This “retinoid” system, in turn, forms 
part of a larger neuro-cognitive model that is able to form many other useful 
perceptual and higher cognitive functions. 
As Trehub observes: 
We cannot imagine our own behavior without an awareness at the same 
time of a 3D space around us within which our behavior occurs. One of 
the distinguishing characteristics of humans is the ability to think of future 
situations and to plan ahead. We not only make mental representations of 
the existing layout of salient objects in our immediate spatial environment, 
but we are also able to ‘‘picture’’ the structure of hypothetical environments 
which may contain different objects in different locations. The self is the 
indispensable object that must be represented in our sensible space when 
we adapt our behavior to current circumstances, when we contemplate 
our behavioral choices, and when we plan for future contingencies. What 
we must foresee and what we must do occur in a 3D space surrounding 
a point of reference corresponding to our selves. If we are to understand 
the biophysical basis of self, then we must ﬁrst give a plausible neuronal 
account of how the human brain is able to represent an object-ﬁlled space 
from an egocentric perspective. (TREHUB, 2007, p. 311).
By what biologically plausible means can the human brain create the 
diversity of veridical and hypothetical models/representations claimed 
above? I argue that (1) there is a system of mechanisms in the brain whose 
minimal properties can be speciﬁed and which can be demonstrated 
to have the competence to create such models, (2) that these neuronal 
mechanisms provide an internal structural analog of 3D space within 
which all phenomenal events are represented, and (3) that the system 
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utilizes a compact and dynamic neuronal center which represents the self 
within the brain’s analog of 3D space. (TREHUB, 2007, p. 311).
Trehub (1991, 2007) goes on to give a detailed account of how such 
spatial relationships might be encoded in a subset of retinoid neurodynamics 
including a model of depth perception and stereoscopic vision with both 
testable elements and predictions that place it squarely within the domain of 
normal science.
More recently, Rudrauf et al have developed a mathematical, projective 
consciousness model of how the brain constructs a three-dimensional model 
of the sensory world in which they posit projective geometry as a
necessary form of the generative model that must be deployed by any 
conscious organism that navigates a three-dimensional world. Put simply, 
to produce generalizable and veridical predictions, the internal models 
used by our brain must recapitulate the formal geometry of the world 
we are trying to make predictions about (from situated standpoints). 
In this setting, the projective consciousness model (PCM) regards 
projective geometry (in three dimensions) as the optimal geometry for 
situated inferences to the best explanation regarding sensory impressions. 
(RUDRAUF et al., 2017, p. 108).
As with the other theories mentioned above, their theory is grounded, 
in the first instance, in conscious phenomenology, and they develop a form of 
indirect realism in which phenomenal space is thought of as thought of as a 
biologically useful, projective representation of the world, not to be confused 
with the world itself (see also Velmans, 1990, 2009):
Investigations into the phenomenology of consciousness have emphasized 
that consciousness is grounded in a subjective standpoint and a space of 
sorts, using the basic schematics of a subject-object opposition and a 
relation between a center and a periphery […] Spatiality is a pervasive 
aspect of subjective experience. When one closes one’s eyes in a silent 
room, under normal conditions, one experiences a “lived space”, to 
adopt a term of art commonly used in the phenomenological tradition, 
the sense of a 3-dimensional surrounding space that is invariant even 
as the state of the outside world constantly changes. We find such a 
space in both waking consciousness and in dream. It seems central to 
conscious experience in general, to the way it represents a world in 
three dimensions, in which we locate ourselves and from which we 
perceive, imagine, and plan action […] In this context, the particular 
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“way” such a space appears is considered as an immanent structure of the 
subjective conscious experience we “live through”, and to which we have 
phenomenological access; it is not a feature of the world represented 
[…] (it only secondarily becomes itself an object of representation, 
something to which our attention can be drawn, just as one does not 
normally notice one’s hand in hammering, though one can). As a first 
approximation, lived space can be said to feature, by default, a primarily 
egocentric representation of space, defining a peri-personal and an extra-
personal environment in relation to a body, and oriented along directions 
of perception and action […] lived space ought not be considered a 
direct representation of the intrinsic spatial structure of the world, and 
can be conceived as an adaptive simulation, “user interface”, projection 
or controlled “hallucination” that is actively constructed by the brain 
in real-time […] Experientially, outside of pathological conditions, it 
engenders an illusion of direct realism, (i.e., of being conscious of the 
world itself directly) […] which is probably a necessary condition for 
effectively representing our real environment and acting within it. But 
dreams, imagination, hallucinations, out of body experiences (OBEs), 
sensory substitution, vertigo, and various neurological syndromes, 
provide compelling evidence that our lived, moment-by-moment 
representation and subjective experience of ambient physical space is the 
construction of a virtual world. In fact, the normal, robust, ongoing 
conscious experience of co-localization in space of one’s subjective point 
of view and of one’s own body is contingent upon a process of multi-
sensory inference, and reflects a dynamical balance in sensorimotor 
calibration. (RUDRAUF et al., 2017, p. 108).
They then go on to develop a formal, projective, geometric model of how 
egocentric space is experienced, following an approach that is analogous to the 
methods used for 3-dimensional mapping of objects from sets of 2-dimensional 
pictures that are widely used in architecture, virtual reality, computer graphic 
imaging and computer vision, drawing on the principle that, 
In lived space, objects, points of view and their relations of incidence are 
represented with the shape of 3-dimensional projections in perspective, 
along certain directions, from a certain standpoint; parallel lines converge 
on an implicit or explicit horizon at infinity. It is through the lens of 
this inherently perspectival geometry that a world of transcendent 
3-dimensional objects in Euclidean space existing in independence of 
any particular perspectives (whose sizes remain the same irrespective of 
distance) is consciously experienced. (RUDRAUF et al., 2017, p. 110).
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And, as do Trehub, and Pereira, they treat these projective processes as 
a front end of human adaptive functioning that feeds information into higher-
order cognitive-inferential processes that, ultimately, guide behaviour—and give 
suggestions about which neural structures are likely to be involved. In particular,
the model predicts that the brain should embed two main engines that 
are hierarchically coupled […] (1) an inference engine grouping higher 
levels of control concerned with homeostasis, emotion, memory, language 
and executive functions, or more generally personal relevance; and (2) a 
lower (sensorimotor) projective geometry engine, relying on multisensory 
integration and motor programming and concerned with representing the 
world and the body in the world. (RUDRAUF et al., 2017, p.126).
Broadly viewed, Pereira’s orientation is more philosophical, Trehub’s 
neurophysiological, and Rudrauf et al, mathematical, but their models converge 
in how they conceptualise the phenomenology of conscious experience, the 
role of projective processes in cognitive functioning and behaviour, and the 
need to relate conscious phenomenology to its supporting neural functioning. 
As these models are complex, an evaluation of their fit with the evidence is 
beyond the scope of this brief commentary. Nor is there space to compare or 
evaluate their relative merits in detail. However, even this brief presentation 
should make it apparent that investigations of perceptual projection are 
forming into a productive, research programme that may provide central 
insights into the nature of human consciousness. 
VELMANS, M. Como investigar a projeção perceptual: um comentário a Pereira Jr., “A 
teoria projetiva da consciência: da neurociência à psicologia filosófica”. Trans/Form/Ação, 
Marília, v. 41, p. 233-242, 2018. Edição Especial.
resumo: Este comentário enfoca o status científico da projeção perceptiva - uma característica central 
da teoria da consciência de Pereira. Em seu artigo alvo, ele recorre ao meu trabalho anterior para 
desenvolver uma estrutura explicativa para integrar a experiência consciente visível em primeira pessoa 
com os correlatos neurais visíveis de terceira pessoa e as causas antecedentes que formam a experiência 
consciente em uma estrutura bipolar que contém tanto um sentido de eu (criado por processos 
projetivos interoceptivos) e um sentido do mundo (criado por processos projetivos exteroceptivos). 
Enfatizo que a projeção perceptiva é um efeito psicológico (e não uma explicação para esse efeito) e 
relaciono modalidades de seu estudo na psicologia experimental, por exemplo em estudos de percepção 
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de profundidade em visão e audição, experiências de profundidade em superfícies bidimensionais 
em imagens estereoscópicas, cinemas 3D, hologramas e realidades virtuais. Eu então justaponho o 
modelo explicativo de Pereira com dois outros modelos que têm objetivos e suposições similares, mas 
orientações diferentes, o modelo do sistema retinóide de Trehub, que se concentra principalmente no 
funcionamento neural do sistema visual, e o modelo de consciência projetiva de Rudrauf et al., que 
estabelece raciocínios geométricos para especificar os requisitos de organismos que precisam navegar em 
um mundo tridimensional, e como eles podem ser implementados no processamento de informação 
no contexto humano. Juntos, esses modelos ilustram abordagens convergentes e divergentes para 
compreender o papel dos processos projetivos na consciência humana.
palavras-cHave: Projeção perceptual. Teoria projetiva da consciência. Modelo retinoide. Fenomeno-
logia da consciência. Mundo fenomenal.
references
GOODALE, M. A. Duplex vision: separate cortical pathways for conscious perception 
and the control of action. In: VELMANS, M.; SCHNEIDER, S. (ed.). The Blackwell 
Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007. p 616-627.
GOODALE, M. A.; MILNER, A. D. Sight unseen: an exploration of conscious and 
unconscious vision. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
HERSHENSON, M. Visual space perception. Cambridge: Mass.: MIT Press, 1998.
HUSSERL, E. Ideas: general introduction to pure phenomenology. Translation by F. 
Kersten. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1913.
LEHAR, S. Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy of subjective conscious experience: a 
gestalt bubble model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, v. 26, n. 4, p. 375-444, 2003.
MITTERAUER, B. The proemial synapse: consciousness-generating glial-neuronal units. 
In: PEREIRA JR., A.; LEHMANN, D. (ed.). The unity of mind, brain and world: current 
perspectives on a science of consciousness. Cambridge-UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2013. p. 233-264.
NAGEL, T. What is it like to be a bat? Philos. Rev., v. 83, n. 4, p. 435-450, 1974.
PEREIRA JR, A. The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to 
philosophical psychology. Trans/Form/Ação, v. 41, n. especial, 2018, p. 199-232.
ROBERTSON, L. Space, objects, minds, and brains. New York: Psychology Press, 2004.
RUDRAUF, D. et al. A mathematical model of embodied consciousness. J. Theor. Biol., v. 
428, p. 106-131, 2017.
TREHUB, A. Neuronal models for cognitive processes: networks for learning, perception 
and imagination. J. Theor. Biol., v. 65, p. 141-169, 1977.
______. The cognitive brain. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001.
242  Trans/Form/Ação, Marília, v. 41, p. 233-242, 2018, Edição Especial
VELMANS, M.
______. Space, self and the theatre of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, v. 16, 
n. 2, p. 310-330, 2007.
VELMANS, M. Consciousness, brain and the physical world. Philosophical Psychology, v. 
3, n. 1, p. 77-99, 1990.
______. A reflexive science of consciousness. In: BOCK, G.; MARSH, J. (ed.). 
Experimental and theoretical studies of consciousness. Chichester: John Wiley, 1993. p. 81-99.
______. Physical, psychological and virtual realities. In: WOOD, J. (ed.). The virtual 
embodied. London: Routledge, 1998. p. 45-60.
______. Understanding consciousness. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2009. 
______. What and where are conscious experiences? Dualism, reductionism and reflexive 
monism. In: ALMQVIST, K.; HAAG, A. (ed.). The return of consciousness: a new science 
on old questions. Stockholm: Axel and Margaret Axson Johnson Foundation, 2017. p. 
125-143.
WILLIFORD, K.; RUDRAUF, D.; LANDINI, G. The paradoxes of subjectivity 
and the projective structure of consciousness. In: MIGUENS, S.; PREYER, G. (ed.). 
Consciousness and subjectivity. Frankfurt a. M.: Ontos, 2012. p. 47-321.
Recebido: 15/11/2018
Aceito: 15/11/2018
